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ABSTRACT
In Sell v. United States, the Supreme Court announced a
constitutional standard permitting involuntary medication of mentally 
ill criminal defendants to render them competent to stand trial. Lower 
federal courts have struggled to apply the Court’s balancing test, 
reading the same Sell language to impose different requirements. 
While much ink has been spilled debating whether the Sell standard
is sufficiently rights-protective, less attention has been devoted to the 
state court implementations of Sell. But because many more criminal
prosecutions take place in state court than in federal court, it stands to
reason that significantly more Sell requests should arise in state court.
This Note provides the first comprehensive review of Sell in the states. 
That review reveals that state courts have largely been forced to
choose among conflicting federal approaches to Sell. Therefore, fixing
Sell in the states requires assessing those interpretations to determine 
which one state courts should follow—namely, the approach most 
faithful to the balance struck by the Sell Court. After making that 
assessment, this Note proceeds to consider state-specific sources of law 
as alternative paths to Sell reform. 
State constitutional law has yet to play a meaningful role in Sell
cases and is unlikely to do so in the future. Instead, state legislatures
can and should act to give structure to the Sell regime in their states, 
give guidance to the state courts, and, if desired, create additional 
protections for defendants. Providing such a comprehensive regime 
would free state courts from what is essentially a policy decision— 
picking between the various Sell approaches and determining how Sell
should be applied in the states.
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INTRODUCTION
In a pivotal scene in the classic film One Flew Over the Cuckoo’s 
Nest, grim orderlies lead the protagonist into a sterile white room and 
strap him to a gurney for involuntary treatment of his mental illness.1 
They stick electrodes to his skull and jolt his brain with electricity.2 For 
thirty painful seconds he convulses.3 This scene has been credited with 
“irreparably tarnishing the image of electroconvulsive therapy” and 
“quickening its departure from mainstream mental health care.”4 Yet
involuntary treatment of the mentally ill continues. 
Indeed, the Supreme Court held in Sell v. United States5 that 
forced administration of antipsychotic medication is constitutional in 
certain contexts, including for the sole purpose of restoring a mentally
ill criminal defendant to competency6 to stand trial7—even for capital 
cases.8 Instead of electroconvulsive therapy, involuntary mental health 
treatment now means forced pill ingestion or a needle in the arm of an
unwillingly restrained patient.9 
Although the normative concerns of forced medication need to be 
acknowledged,10 this Note focuses on the legal framework announced
by the Sell Court. That framework is derived from the Constitution, as 
the physical intrusion of forced medication implicates a “significant 
1. ONE FLEW OVER THE CUCKOO’S NEST (Fantasy Films 1975). 
2. Id.
 3. Id.
 4. Jon Swaine, How ‘One Flew Over the Cuckoo’s Nest’ Changed Psychiatry, TELEGRAPH
(Feb. 1, 2011), https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/northamerica/usa/8296954/How-
One-Flew-Over-the-Cuckoos-Nest-changed-psychiatry.html [https://perma.cc/FFD7-YUSG].
5. Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166 (2003).
6. “The test for competenc[y] . . . is whether the defendant has the present ability to
understand the charges against him and communicate effectively with defense counsel.” Cooper
v. Oklahoma, 517 U.S. 348, 368 (1996). 
7. Sell, 539 U.S. at 179. 
8. See, e.g., Eyder Peralta, Jared Loughner Pleads Guilty to Arizona Shootings, NPR (Aug. 
7, 2012, 3:31 PM), https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2012/08/07/158376830/jared-
loughner-arizona-shooting-suspect-pleads-guilty-to-killing-6 [https://perma.cc/HX9S-YMYU] 
(describing the case of Jared Loughner, a mass shooter who was involuntarily medicated at trial
and avoided the death penalty by pleading guilty).
9. Robert E. Cochrane, Bryon L. Herbel, Maureen L. Reardon & Kristina P. Lloyd, The 
Sell Effect: Involuntary Medication Treatment Is a “Clear and Convincing” Success, 37 LAW &
HUM. BEHAV. 107, 110 (2013). 
10. Specifically, forced medication can be criticized as violating the bodily integrity of the
mentally ill. See ELYN R. SAKS, REFUSING CARE: FORCED TREATMENT AND THE RIGHTS OF
THE MENTALLY ILL 96 (2002) (describing the many reasons for refusing medication, including
“profound fears of the effects, side effects, and risks of the medication—both physical and
mental”).






















   
        
7372019] HOW THE STATES CAN FIX SELL 
constitutionally protected liberty interest in avoiding the unwanted 
administration of antipsychotic drugs.”11 In such cases, courts weigh the 
individual’s liberty interest against the societal interest in involuntary
medication.12 
The Sell Court justified forced medication for competency
restoration by invoking the important government interest in the 
prosecution of serious crimes.13 Along the way, it declared a four-
pronged test for balancing the relevant interests in five concise 
paragraphs.14 The Sell standard requires that (1) the government’s
interest be “important,” meaning that a “serious crime” is involved and 
“[s]pecial circumstances” do not lessen the interest; (2) forced
medication will “significantly further” that interest; (3) less intrusive 
but similarly effective alternatives are not available; and 
(4) medication is “medically appropriate.”15 If each prong is satisfied, 
the balance weighs in favor of the government and involuntary
medication is permissible;16 otherwise, forced medication is 
unconstitutional.17 
Unfortunately, the Supreme Court’s articulation of that balancing 
test is more a model of judicial brevity than of clarity.18 And in the 
fifteen years since, the lower federal courts have struggled with its 
application, reading the same Sell language to require different 
things.19 Moreover, some courts evince a hostility toward Sell orders 
that threatens to undermine the constitutional balance set by the 
Supreme Court by skewing that balance in favor of defendants.20 
Indeed, despite their efforts to remain faithful to the law announced by 
the Supreme Court, certain courts have gone even further to impose 
11. Sell, 539 U.S. at 178 (quotations omitted) (quoting Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210,
221 (1990)).
 12. Harper, 494 U.S. at 227 (upholding involuntary medication when a mentally ill prison
inmate poses a danger to himself or others and the treatment is in the inmate’s medical interest).
 13. Sell, 539 U.S. at 180. 
14. Id. at 180–81. 
15. Id. (emphases omitted). 
16. Id.
 17. Id. 
18. See Dora W. Klein, Curiouser and Curiouser: Involuntary Medications and Incompetent
Criminal Defendants After Sell v. United States, 13 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 897, 901–03 (2005)
(pointing out what Sell left out). 
19. See infra Part II. 
20. See infra Part IV.A.4. 
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738 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 69:735
new Sell requirements, effectively raising the constitutional floor 
beyond that set by the Sell Court.21 
While much ink has been spilled debating whether the Sell
standard is sufficiently rights-protective,22 less attention has been
devoted to the state court implementations of Sell.23 But because many
more criminal prosecutions take place in state court than in federal
court, it stands to reason that significantly more Sell requests should
arise in state court.24 Despite this, state high courts have been slow to
engage with this issue—only seven state high courts have decided a Sell
case to date.25 And while academic commentary exists for individual 
states and cases,26 no treatment has comprehensively reviewed how the
state courts have handled Sell in light of the competing federal circuit
interpretations. 
This Note finds that state courts have largely been forced to 
choose among those conflicting federal approaches to Sell. Therefore,
fixing Sell in the states requires assessing those interpretations to
21. See infra Part IV.A. 
22. See, e.g., Klein, supra note 18; Christopher Slobogin, Sell’s Conundrums: The Right of
Incompetent Defendants To Refuse Anti-Psychotic Medication, 89 WASH. U. L. REV. 1523 (2012).
23. Much of the academic literature in the state context consists of student pieces. See, e.g., 
Emily Ryan, Note, Involuntary Administration of Anti-Psychotic Medication to Prisoners for Trial
and Post-Conviction Relief Competence: The Denial of a Protected Liberty Interest Without Due
Process, 23 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 549 (2014). While many of these pieces focus on 
whether Sell is sufficiently rights-protective, this Note accepts Sell as the law and looks instead to 
how it has been applied.
24. In 2005, 92,226 defendants were brought before federal district courts on criminal
charges. U.S. COURTS, TABLE 5.1 U.S. DISTRICT COURTS. CRIMINAL CASES AND DEFENDANTS
FILED, TERMINATED, PENDING (INCLUDING TRANSFERS), https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/ 
default/files/statistics_import_dir/Table501_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/AM44-C9R2] (covering 1990,
1995, 2000, and 2002 through 2006). A year later, an estimated 2.6 million felony cases were filed 
in state court and 1.1 million defendants received felony convictions. See State Court Caseload
Statistics: Criminal – Felony Trend in General Jurisdiction Courts, COURT STATISTICS PROJECT, 
http://www.courtstatistics.org/Other-Pages/StateCourtCaseloadStatistics.aspx [https://perma.cc/ 
ZL42-W7MU] (tabulating felony caseloads from each state); BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS,
FELONY SENTENCES IN STATE COURTS, 2006 – STATISTICAL TABLES 1 (revised 2010),
https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/fssc06st.pdf [https://perma.cc/9P2M-28LA] (estimating
felony convictions in state courts). From 2003 to 2009, 287 requests were made to federal courts
for involuntary-medication orders. Cochrane et al., supra note 9, at 109. Extrapolating that same
rate of involuntary-medication requests to the states means that approximately one thousand such
requests would be sought each year in state court, as opposed to the fifty or so sought each year
in federal court.
 25. See infra note 95 (citing nine Sell cases decided by the high courts of Connecticut,
Georgia, Oregon, Nevada, New Mexico, Pennsylvania, and Utah).
 26. See, e.g., J.W. Looney, The Arkansas Approach to Competency To Stand Trial: “Nailing 
Jelly to a Tree,” 62 ARK. L. REV. 683 (2009); Brian D. Shannon, Prescribing a Balance: The Texas
Legislative Responses to Sell v. United States, 41 ST. MARY’S L.J. 309 (2009). 



















   
      
 
     
 
 
7392019] HOW THE STATES CAN FIX SELL 
determine which one state courts should follow—namely, the approach 
most faithful to the balance struck by the Sell Court. The cases reveal
that some state courts have followed the federal circuits that have
strayed from Sell, leading to further divergence.
The different approaches to implementing Sell are problematic,27 
yet this Note cannot resolve the divergence problem and does not 
attempt to. It does not argue that the Sell standard is perfect—though 
it has proved effective28—only that it is the law and that courts must
faithfully implement it. Sell’s four-pronged standard strikes a careful 
balance, one which is upset by further tinkering. While other scholars 
may be correct that riffs on Sell are justified as a matter of policy, 
judges should not be the ones creating policy. Ultimately, unless state 
courts find additional protections as a matter of state constitutional 
law—which is unlikely29—they should hew closely to the Sell Court’s 
careful balancing. 
To the extent that restructuring Sell is desired to further protect 
state criminal defendants, state legislatures are more competent to
implement that restructuring. And while courts would ultimately be 
responsible for weighing the constitutionality of involuntary
medication, legislatures are better suited to establish the detailed 
framework of that decision-making process. States could pass 
constitutional amendments providing for absolute constitutional rights 
to bodily integrity or privacy, or they could enact statutes clarifying the 
requisite procedures and findings necessary for involuntary 
medication. 
Of course, this solution would only exacerbate the problem of 
disuniformity of the Sell regime in the states. But that disuniformity has 
already arisen thanks to various states following divergent federal
circuit interpretations. Under the approach this Note advocates for, the
27. First, the divergence means that despite a constitutionally protected interest being at
stake, criminal defendants will be treated differently in different courts. Second, it means that
some courts are just getting this wrong by either applying Sell too laxly and allowing forced
medication or imposing additional requirements not justified by Sell that undermine the 
government’s important interests in prosecution. Finally, the issue is compounded for state courts,
which must now sift through Sell’s conflicting progeny from the federal circuits, leading to even
more divergence. 
28. “Effective” here refers to success rates in restoring defendants to competence to stand 
trial. See Cochrane et al., supra note 9, at 113 (“Following a judicial hearing and authorization to
treat these federal criminal defendants, the majority (79%) [of defendants treated involuntarily
under Sell from 2003–2009] demonstrated significant improvement and were considered to be
restored to competency.”). 
29. See infra Part IV.B. 
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740 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 69:735
resulting disuniformity would be more tolerable because it would come 
from state legislatures or state voters. After all, while federal 
constitutional law should be consistent across the country,30 the states
are expected to serve as laboratories of democracy.31 In sum, this
Note’s proposal is simple: state courts should remain faithful to the Sell 
balance, and any changes to that balance should come from state
legislatures.
This Note proceeds in five parts. Part I describes Sell, its
constitutional basis, and the four-pronged Sell inquiry. Part II looks to
the last fifteen years of Sell’s implementation in the federal circuits,
categorizing the conflicting interpretations into a “Basic Approach”
that simply mirrors the four prongs and an “Elaborative Approach” 
that imposes additional constraints.32 Part III then turns to the state 
court cases, finding that the state courts have generally split between 
the Basic and Elaborative Approaches of the federal circuit courts,
while also introducing even greater divergence into the Sell regime. 
Part IV goes on to describe how that regime should be
implemented in the state courts. As a matter of federal constitutional 
law, the state high courts are likely to follow in the divergent footsteps 
of the federal circuits, potentially leading to additional confusion. This 
Note advocates for a different approach: apply only those 
requirements that are clearly grounded in Sell, without imposing
additional constraints that upset the balance, and leave to state 
legislatures whether to provide additional protections for state
defendants.
Part V considers alternative sources of reform for the Sell regime 
for states who consider Sell inadequate. Although state courts could 
find additional protections for mentally ill criminal defendants in their 
state constitution, this has yet to occur and is unlikely to do so. This 
Note concludes that the better avenue for reform lies in the state 
legislatures, who have the political mandate to make policy and the 
30. See, e.g., Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 24 (1980) (providing that application of federal
constitutional law “should not depend upon where the [constitutional] violation occurred”
(quoting Green v. Carlson, 581 F.2d 669, 675 (7th Cir. 1978))). 
31. See New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)
(“It is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single courageous State may, if its
citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments without risk
to the rest of the country.”).
32. The Basic–Elaborative dichotomy is this Note’s attempt to categorize the different Sell 
interpretations. These terms have no genesis in the case law. 
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7412019] HOW THE STATES CAN FIX SELL 
legislative resources to determine which reforms are needed to
improve upon Sell. 
I. THE SELL STANDARD
This Note addresses a very specific situation: involuntary 
medication of criminal defendants to restore them to competency to 
stand trial. Any discussion of such involuntary medication must begin
with Sell. And any actors—judicial or otherwise—must consider the 
constitutional balance struck by the Sell Court in formulating a 
governing legal regime. Accordingly, this Note begins by reviewing
Sell, its constitutional basis, and the four-pronged Sell inquiry.
The Fifth Amendment provides that “[n]o person shall . . . be
deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.”33 In
Washington v. Harper,34 the Supreme Court recognized a “significant 
liberty interest in avoiding the unwanted administration of 
antipsychotic drugs.”35 There, the Court considered whether a mentally 
ill prison inmate could be involuntarily medicated without a judicial 
hearing.36 After weighing the individual’s protected liberty interest 
against the state’s interest in prison safety and security, the Court held 
that the Due Process Clause37 permits involuntary medication of 
mentally ill prison inmates “if the inmate is dangerous to himself or 
others and the treatment is in the inmate’s medical interest.”38 
However, the Court concluded that that determination need not be
made by a judge, as administrative review conducted by medical 
professionals was more appropriate and effective.39 Two years later, in
Riggins v. Nevada,40 the Court reaffirmed the Harper test as applied in
the trial setting and held that involuntary medication is constitutional 
if medically appropriate and essential for the safety of the defendant
33. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
34. Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210 (1990).
 35. Id. at 221 (recognizing a liberty interest under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment).
 36. Id. at 213.
 37. While Harper involved Fourteenth Amendment Due Process, the analysis is identical
under Fifth Amendment Due Process. Cf. Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 8 (1964) (“The Fourteenth
Amendment secures against state invasion the same privilege that the Fifth Amendment
guarantees against federal infringement . . . .”).
 38. Harper, 494 U.S. at 227.
 39. Id. at 233.
40. Riggins v. Nevada, 504 U.S. 127 (1992). 
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742 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 69:735
or others.41 However, neither Harper nor Riggins addressed 
medication for the sole purpose of restoring a mentally ill criminal
defendant to competence to stand trial. 
A decade passed before the Court addressed that issue. In Sell, the 
Court reversed an involuntary-medication order for a nondangerous 
criminal defendant and in doing so, created a broad scheme for 
involuntary medication in the pretrial context.42 First, the Court again
reaffirmed the balance struck in Harper, weighing the government’s 
interest (in trying the defendant) against the defendant’s
constitutionally protected liberty interest in being free from unwanted 
antipsychotic drugs.43 With that in mind, the Court announced four 
prongs, each of which must be satisfied to permit involuntary 
medication: 
(1) The Government-Interest Prong: whether “important
governmental interests are at stake,” such as the interest in
prosecution of a “serious crime,” and whether there are any 
“[s]pecial circumstances [that] may lessen the importance of that
interest.”44 
(2) The Defendant-Interest Prong: whether “involuntary medication
will significantly further” the government’s interest, meaning that
medication is “substantially likely to render the defendant 
competent to stand trial” and “substantially unlikely to have side
effects that will interfere significantly with the defendant’s ability 
to assist counsel.”45 
(3) The Least-Invasive-Means Prong: whether “involuntary
medication is necessary to further” the government’s interest,
meaning that there are no “alternative, less intrusive treatments”
or “less intrusive means for administering the drugs” that are
likely to “achieve substantially the same results.”46 
(4) The Medically Appropriate Prong: whether “administration of 
the drugs is medically appropriate, i.e., in the patient’s best
medical interest in light of his medical condition.”47 
41. Id. at 135.
42. Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166, 186 (2003).
 43. Id. at 178–79. 
44. Id. at 180.
 45. Id. at 181.
 46. Id.
 47. Id.











     
   
   
     
  
        
    
    





   
   
    
 
7432019] HOW THE STATES CAN FIX SELL 
At bottom, the test encapsulates a single question: “Has the 
Government . . . shown a need for [involuntary] treatment sufficiently 
important to overcome the individual’s protected interest in refusing 
it?”48 Yet the Court spent little time addressing the practical
implications of the four-pronged test it announced to answer that 
question. Since then, the Court has let the federal circuits define 
“important government interests,” “serious crimes,” “special 
circumstances,” “substantially likely,” “substantially unlikely,”
“significantly further,” “necessary to further,” and “medically
appropriate.”49 Nevertheless, those courts’ obligation is clear: they
must faithfully adhere to the constitutional balance set forth by the 
Supreme Court. 
II. SELL IN THE LOWER FEDERAL COURTS
State court Sell opinions rely exclusively on federal case law. Thus, 
the federal interpretations of Sell are a necessary backdrop for 
analyzing the implementation of Sell in the state courts. From Sell’s 
issuance in 2003 to 2018, the federal courts of appeals issued sixty-one 
opinions directly applying the Sell standard.50 The disparity in Sell
outcomes among the circuits is striking. For example, the Second,
Third, Fifth, Eleventh, and District of Columbia Circuits have green-
lighted involuntary medication in every Sell case that came before 
them.51 In contrast, the Fourth and Ninth Circuits have halted forced 
medication in twelve of twenty-six Sell cases.52 This disparity in 
48. Id. at 183.
 49. See Slobogin, supra note 22, at 1542 (“Sell raises many more questions than it answers.”).
50. These cases were identified by filtering all Westlaw case references to Sell by circuit 
court, then reviewing each of those decisions to determine which ones directly apply the Sell
standard. 
51. See United States v. Claflin, 670 F. App’x 372 (5th Cir. 2016); United States v. Pfeifer,
661 F. App’x 618 (11th Cir. 2016); United States v. Ruark, 611 F. App’x 591 (11th Cir. 2015);
United States v. Cruz, 757 F.3d 372 (3d Cir. 2014); United States v. Dillon, 738 F.3d 284 (D.C. Cir.
2014); United States v. Fuller, 581 F. App’x 835 (11th Cir. 2014); United States v. Hardy, 724 F.3d
280 (2d Cir. 2013); United States v. Gutierrez, 704 F.3d 442 (5th Cir. 2013); United States v. Mann,
532 F. App’x 481 (5th Cir. 2013); United States v. Diaz, 630 F.3d 1314 (11th Cir. 2011); United
States v. Muhammad, 398 F. App’x 848 (3d Cir. 2010); United States v. Grape, 549 F.3d 591 (3d
Cir. 2008); United States v. Palmer, 507 F.3d 300 (5th Cir. 2007); United States v. White, 431 F.3d 
431 (5th Cir. 2005); United States v. Gomes, 387 F.3d 157 (2d Cir. 2004). 
52. See United States v. Onuoha, 820 F.3d 1049 (9th Cir. 2016); United States v. Watson, 793 
F.3d 416 (4th Cir. 2015); United States v. Brooks, 750 F.3d 1090 (9th Cir. 2014); United States v. 
Chatmon, 718 F.3d 369 (4th Cir. 2013); United States v. Ruiz-Gaxiola, 623 F.3d 684 (9th Cir.
2010); United States v. White, 620 F.3d 401 (4th Cir. 2010); United States v. Bush, 585 F.3d 806
(4th Cir. 2009); United States v. Casillas, 298 F. App’x 675 (9th Cir. 2008); United States v. Curtis,
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744 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 69:735
outcomes follows from different approaches to reviewing Sell orders.53 
The remainder of this Part explores these differences by examining
how these courts interpret the more contentious Sell prongs. 
A. The Government-Interest Prong 
The Sell Court explained that the Government-Interest Prong 
required the prosecution of a “serious crime”54 but “offered no 
guidance on how to determine the seriousness of an offense.”55 Circuits
generally look to the potential penalty for the crime charged but 
disagree on which formulation to use.56 Options include the statutory
minimum57 and maximum punishments,58 the probable sentencing
269 F. App’x 662 (9th Cir. 2008); United States v. Hernandez-Vasquez, 513 F.3d 908 (9th Cir. 
2008); United States v. Espinoza-Pareda, 226 F. App’x 730 (9th Cir. 2007); United States v. Evans,
404 F.3d 227 (4th Cir. 2005). 
53. A consensus exists on some threshold Sell issues. For example, the circuits have
uniformly held that the government bears the burden of satisfying Sell by clear and convincing 
evidence. See, e.g., United States v. Gomes, 387 F.3d 157, 160 (2d Cir. 2004) (basing this decision
on a reading of Riggins v. Nevada, 504 U.S. 127 (1992)). Most circuits also agree that the
Government-Interest Prong is a question of law, while the remaining prongs are questions of fact.
See, e.g., id. at 160. But see United States v. Bradley, 417 F.3d 1107, 1113–14 (10th Cir. 2005)
(holding that the Defendant-Interest Prong is a question of law, reviewed de novo). 
54. Sell, 539 U.S. at 180. 
55. Evans, 404 F.3d at 237; accord United States v. Green, 532 F.3d 538, 547 (6th Cir. 2008)
(“Without more specific guidance or a rigid test, courts are left to fashion appropriate, and
presumably objective parameters by which to assess seriousness.”). 
56. Mounia Rhoulam, Comment, Due Process and Serious Crime: The Vague Term that
Promotes the Forcible Medication of Countless Incompetent Defendants, Trumping Their
Fundamental Liberty, 26 GEO. MASON U. C.R. L.J. 255, 269–74 (2016).
 57. See, e.g., Gomes, 387 F.3d at 160 (“[T]he seriousness of the crime . . . [is] evident from
the substantial sentence Gomes faces if convicted. . . . Gomes faces a possible statutory minimum
of fifteen years’ imprisonment.” (quoting United States v. Gomes, 289 F.3d 71, 86 (2d Cir. 2002))).
 58. See, e.g., Green, 532 F.3d at 548 (looking to the statutory maximum in “both a recognition 
of and respect for the fundamental role of the legislative process in making these seriousness 
determinations, as well as an effort to find some objective standard by which to analyze the first
Sell factor”); Evans, 404 F.3d at 237 (looking to the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence on the right
to trial by jury, which exists only in “serious” criminal cases, and thus concluding that the
maximum statutory penalty is the “primary measure of seriousness”).














   
 
  
   
  
     
 
 
    
 
 
   
  




7452019] HOW THE STATES CAN FIX SELL 
range under sentencing guidelines,59 or a combination of both.60 Sell’s 
silence essentially forces courts to make a policy choice—framed as a 
legal determination—of what constitutes the best objective measure of
a “serious crime.” 
Yet identifying a “serious crime” is only half of the work. The
court must then determine whether “special circumstances . . . lessen 
the importance of [the government’s] interest.”61 The Sell Court 
suggested considering the length of civil confinement that might result 
absent forced medication.62 Prosecution is presumably less imperative 
if the defendant already faces a period of lengthy confinement—even 
if that confinement is in a psychiatric facility rather than in prison.63 
However, the Court quickly cabined this consideration by affirming
that “civil commitment is [not] a substitute for a criminal trial.”64 Other
than civil confinement, courts cannot agree on how many “special
circumstances” the Court identified.65 As a result, courts have 
understandably struggled to apply the special-circumstances inquiry
and weigh those circumstances against the government’s interest in 
prosecution.66 
59. See, e.g., United States v. Hernandez-Vasquez, 513 F.3d 908, 919 (9th Cir. 2008) (“While 
the statutory maximum may be more readily ascertainable, any difficulty in estimating the likely
guideline range exactly is an insufficient reason to ignore Sell’s direction that courts should
consider the specific circumstances of individual defendants in determining the seriousness of a
crime.”). But see Evans, 404 F.3d at 238 (rejecting the sentencing-guidelines approach as
unworkable due to the impossibility of accurately predicting the probable sentence at the 
involuntary-medication stage of the trial).
60. United States v. Valenzuela-Puentes, 479 F.3d 1220, 1226 (10th Cir. 2007) (considering 
both the statutory maximum and the likely guideline sentence, as well as the defendant’s criminal
history in general and recidivism for the specific crime charged).
61. Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166, 180 (2003).
 62. Id. 
63. Id. 
64. Id. (“The potential for future confinement affects, but does not totally undermine, the
strength of the need for prosecution.”).
 65. Compare United States v. Onuoha, 820 F.3d 1049, 1054 (9th Cir. 2016) (identifying five
circumstances), with United States v. Grigsby, 712 F.3d 964, 969–70 (6th Cir. 2013) (identifying
three circumstances), and United States v. Sanderson, 521 F. App’x 232, 235 (4th Cir. 2013)
(identifying a different set of three circumstances). 
66. See, e.g., Slobogin, supra note 22, at 1536 (criticizing the “‘special circumstances’ caveat
to the serious crimes exception” as incoherent).
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B. The Defendant-Interest Prong and the Medically Appropriate 
Prong 
Each circuit engages in an overlapping analysis for the Defendant-
Interest Prong and the Medically Appropriate Prong,67 as both involve 
factual findings regarding the efficacy and appropriateness of 
involuntary medication.68 But while the circuits generally agree that
these prongs involve factual questions reviewed for clear error, not all 
circuits implement that standard in the same way. This Note identifies 
two distinct categories amongst these conflicting approaches: the 
“Basic” and “Elaborative” Approaches. 
1. The Basic Approach.  Under the “Basic Approach” to Sell 
orders, the prongs expressly laid out in Sell are the sole requirements 
for involuntary medication. Courts following this approach— 
specifically, the Second, Third, Eighth, Eleventh, and D.C. Circuits— 
accept the basic Sell framework as is and take seriously the deferential 
standard of review for factual findings.69 If a government expert 
testifies that the four Sell prongs are satisfied and the district court 
agrees, the reviewing circuit defers to the district court’s judgment of 
the expert’s credibility.70 Challenges to those findings are generally
rejected, as “[t]he district court . . . is entitled to resolve such 
evidentiary conflicts given the conflicting expert testimony.”71 This 
approach is predicated on the notion that these are factual findings 
dependent on disputes between medical experts. Because the district 
court heard the experts and weighed credibility, the reviewing court 
will not second-guess that determination absent clear error.72 
67. The Least-Invasive-Means Prong has engendered minimal controversy and will not be 
discussed. 
68. See, e.g., United States v. Chavez, 734 F.3d 1247, 1252–53 (10th Cir. 2013) (explaining 
that a violation of prong two for lack of specific information also results in a violation of prong 
four). The circuits often find violations of these two prongs in tandem. Of the twenty-one federal
cases reversing Sell orders, eight found error on the Government-Interest Prong, eleven on the
Defendant-Interest Prong, two on the Least-Invasive-Means Prong, and nine on the Medically
Appropriate Prong.
 69. See, e.g., United States v. Dillon, 738 F.3d 284, 297–98 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (upholding the 
district court’s findings as not “clearly erroneous”); United States v. Diaz, 630 F.3d 1314, 1332–36 
(11th Cir. 2011) (same); United States v. Fazio, 599 F.3d 835, 840–41 (8th Cir. 2010) (same);
United States v. Gomes, 387 F.3d 157, 159–63 (2d Cir. 2004) (same). 
70. See supra note 69 (citing cases in which circuit courts affirmed the lower courts’ Sell
analyses by deferring to the lower courts’ credibility judgments).
 71. Fazio, 599 F.3d at 841. 
72. See id.
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For example, in United States v. Fazio,73 the Eighth Circuit 
affirmed a medication order, holding that once the district court has 
accepted the testimony of the government’s medical expert, “the
government has met it[s] burden.”74 The affirmed medication order 
merely repeated each Sell prong verbatim and concluded that each was
satisfied.75 As the next Subsection shows, this type of order would not 
survive review in other circuits.76 
2. The Elaborative Approach. In contrast to the Basic Approach,
the Fourth and Ninth Circuit’s “Elaborative Approach” goes beyond 
Sell’s four express prongs to impose additional requirements for 
involuntary-medication orders.77 These supplementary showings—not
expressly articulated in Sell—include individualized evidence of 
medication efficacy, specificity in medication, and elaborately detailed
treatment plans. This approach is also characterized by a general
hostility toward Sell orders, evinced by statements such as “Sell orders 
are disfavored”78 and “involuntary medication orders may sometimes 
be necessary, [but] they carry an unsavory pedigree.”79 This reluctance
to grant Sell orders shapes this approach, turning clear error review 
into something with more of a bite.80 
Much of the Elaborative Approach analysis is focused on the 
Defendant-Interest Prong. This prong requires that forced medication 
be “substantially likely to render the defendant competent to stand 
trial” and “substantially unlikely to have side effects that will interfere
significantly with the defendant’s ability to assist counsel in conducting
a trial defense.”81 The Sell Court did not define “substantially likely” 
or “substantially unlikely” or explain how that determination should
73. United States v. Fazio, 599 F.3d 835 (8th Cir. 2010).
 74. Id. at 841.
 75. Id. at 838.
 76. Compare id. (bare-bones review), with United States v. Evans, 404 F.3d 227, 241–42 (4th 
Cir. 2005) (more stringent review). 
77. For prime examples, see generally United States v. Rivera-Guerrero, 426 F.3d 1130 (9th
Cir. 2005) and Evans, 404 F.3d 227. 
78. Rivera-Guerrero, 426 F.3d at 1137.
79. United States v. Chatmon, 718 F.3d 369, 374 (4th Cir. 2013).
 80. Id. (“[Sell orders] carry an unsavory pedigree. With this understanding of the legal
framework, we now turn to the application of the Sell test . . . .” (citation omitted)). The court 
cited Harper’s reference to the serious side effects of antipsychotic medications as support for the 
“unsavory pedigree” label. Id. (citing Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 229–30 (1990)). 
81. Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166, 181 (2003).
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be made.82 Circuits following this approach have held that it requires 
“an exacting focus on the personal characteristics of the individual 
defendant.”83 These personal characteristics include the defendant’s 
specific diagnosis, the duration of their disorder, other health
conditions and medications, and any other “factors [that] may be 
‘relevant’ under Sell.”84 These circuits distinguish between the general 
efficacy of antipsychotic medication and the likelihood that it will work
on the particular defendant, requiring the government to prove the
latter, not just the former.85 This approach rejects the “syllogism” that 
medication effective in general is likely to be effective in the particular 
case: 
To hold that this type of analysis satisfies Sell’s [Defendant-Interest]
and [Medically Appropriate Prongs] would be to find the government 
necessarily meets its burden in every case it wishes to use atypical
antipsychotic medication. We do not believe that Sell’s analysis
permits such deference.86 
In addition to the exacting focus on the specific defendant, these 
circuits require similar focus on the specific medications that are to be 
approved. This debate centers on whether a Sell order generally 
approving of antipsychotic medication can be upheld87 or whether Sell 
requires the court to consider the specific drugs that are to be
administered.88 The Ninth Circuit held the latter, acknowledging that 
“Sell does not identify a requisite degree of specificity concerning the 
drugs to be used for involuntary medication,”89 but nonetheless finding
an implied requirement that the medication order include the “type of
82. See, e.g., Lea Ann Preston Baecht, Federal Courts’ Interpretations of Sell v. U.S., 37 J.
PSYCHIATRY & L. 413, 423–24 (2009) (“[The Court] failed to define [substantially likely] or
provide any guidance regarding the application of this standard.”).
83. United States v. Baldovinos, 434 F.3d 233, 240 n.5 (4th Cir. 2006).
84. United States v. Evans, 404 F.3d 227, 242 n.12 (4th Cir. 2005).
85. United States v. Bush, 585 F.3d 806, 816 (4th Cir. 2009) (“Thus, in order to satisfy [the 
Defendant-Interest Prong], the government must not only show that a treatment plan works on a
defendant’s type of mental disease in general, but that it is likely to work on this defendant in 
particular.”). 
86. Evans, 404 F.3d at 241.
 87. See, e.g., United States v. Bradley, 417 F.3d 1107 (10th Cir. 2005); United States v. 
Gomes, 387 F.3d 157 (2d Cir. 2004).
88. United States v. Hernandez-Vasquez, 513 F.3d 908 (9th Cir. 2008); Evans, 404 F.3d 227.
 89. Hernandez-Vasquez, 513 F.3d at 916. 
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drugs proposed, their dosage, and the expected duration of a person’s 
exposure.”90 
Emphasizing the need for even greater specificity, the Fourth 
Circuit has imposed a more detailed treatment-plan requirement:
[T]he government must spell out why it proposed the particular
course of treatment, provide the estimated time the proposed 
treatment plan will take to restore the defendant’s competence and 
the criteria it will apply when deciding when to discontinue the 
treatment, describe the plan’s probable benefits and side effect risks 
for the defendant’s particular medical condition, show how it will deal
with the plan’s probable side effects, and explain why . . . the benefits
of the treatment plan outweigh the costs of its side effects.91 
Thus, while a district court employing the Basic Approach need satisfy
only the four prongs and enjoys a deferential standard of review, a 
court in an Elaborative Approach jurisdiction is subject to more
exacting scrutiny that assesses both the substantive content of the Sell
order and evidence supporting it. 
This disparity in federal approaches has repercussions extending
beyond the federal courts, as Sell is a constitutional standard that 
applies to the states as well,92 and states hear the vast majority of
criminal cases.93 Yet even though state courts have also wrestled with
Sell, their approaches have received little academic attention. This next 
Part explores how state high courts have picked and chosen amongst 
the conflicting federal approaches to decide what Sell means in the 
states. 
III. SELL IN THE STATE COURTS
Compared to the federal circuits, the state high courts have been 
slower to engage with Sell, likely due to the availability of state
intermediate appellate review and the discretionary nature of most 
90. United States v. Rivera-Guerrero, 426 F.3d 1130, 1142 (9th Cir. 2005) (quoting United
States v. Williams, 356 F.3d 1045, 1056 (9th Cir. 2004)). This requirement can be traced back to
“the unique nature of involuntary antipsychotic medication and the attendant liberty interest.”
Williams, 356 F.3d at 1056. 
91. Evans, 404 F.3d at 242 (footnote and citations omitted). 
92. State judges must apply federal constitutional law under the Supremacy Clause. U.S.
CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. 
93. See supra note 24. 
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750 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 69:735
state-high-court dockets.94 Thus, while the federal circuits must 
confront Sell’s dilemmas thanks to their embrace of appeal as a right,
the state high courts have been able to allow the field to further 
develop in the lower state courts. In the fifteen years since Sell, only 
seven state high courts have issued an opinion directly applying Sell.95 
Perhaps unsurprisingly, these decisions reveal that the state high courts 
have largely followed the lead of the federal circuits, picking between 
the various federal approaches and finding new avenues of 
disagreement.  
A. The Government-Interest Prong 
Few state high courts have comprehensively addressed the
complicated balancing inherent in Sell’s Government-Interest Prong.
Most of these cases have involved defendants facing murder charges, 
where the important government interest—prosecution of the ultimate 
crime—is never really at issue.96 In the few noncapital cases where the 
court had to determine whether the crime was “serious,” the Utah 
Supreme Court utilized the statutory maximum sentence to determine 
seriousness,97 the Oregon Supreme Court utilized both the statutory
maximum and likely imposed sentence,98 and the Connecticut Supreme
Court looked to both the statutory maximum and statutory minimum 
and concluded that the court did not have to settle on one approach
because the crime was serious under either.99 
In considering whether “special circumstances” undermine the 
government’s interest, the state high courts have employed a uniform 
94. See Steven Shavell, On the Design of the Appeals Process: The Optimal Use of
Discretionary Review Versus Direct Appeal, 39 J. LEGAL STUD. 63, 84 (2010) (“[I]n state supreme 
courts, appeals are more often subject to discretionary review than not . . . .”). This would suggest
that state intermediate courts are doing the work—where those courts exist—in the states where
the state high court has yet to address Sell. See infra Part III.C. 
95. See State v. Wang, 145 A.3d 906 (Conn. 2016); State v. Seekins, 8 A.3d 491 (Conn. 2010);
Warren v. State, 778 S.E.2d 749 (Ga. 2015); Lake v. Second Judicial Dist. Court, ex rel. Cty. of
Washoe, 281 P.3d 1193 (Nev. 2009) (unpublished table decision); State v. Cantrell, 179 P.3d 1214
(N.M. 2008); State v. Lopes, 322 P.3d 512 (Or. 2014); Commonwealth v. Sam, 952 A.2d 565 (Pa.
2008); Commonwealth v. Watson, 952 A.2d 541 (Pa. 2008); State v. Barzee, 177 P.3d 48 (Utah 
2007). This list was current as of January 2019. Two more state high court Sell opinions were
issued after this Note was written. See State v. Fitzgerald, 929 N.W.2d 165 (Wisc. 2019); In re
Linda M., 440 P.3d 168 (Alaska 2019).  
96. See, e.g., Warren, 778 S.E.2d at 762 (Government-Interest Prong satisfied); Cantrell, 179 
P.3d at 1221 (Government-Interest Prong uncontested).
 97. Barzee, 177 P.3d at 59. 
98. Lopes, 322 P.3d at 525–27. 
99. Seekins, 8 A.3d at 502–03. 









     
     
 
  
     
 
  




     
 
7512019] HOW THE STATES CAN FIX SELL 
approach. In each case, the defendant claimed that a lengthy period of 
confinement while incompetent to stand trial mitigated the interest in 
prosecution.100 Each court compared the length of time the defendant 
had already spent confined against the potential sentence the
defendant faced if convicted. In three of the four cases, the defendant 
faced significant additional prison time, thus supporting the state’s 
interest in prosecution.101 In the fourth case, the defendant had already 
spent more time in confinement awaiting restoration than he would 
have spent in prison if convicted.102 Accordingly, the court held that
those special circumstances undermined the state’s interest in
prosecution, and thus, the Government-Interest Prong was not 
satisfied.103 No other state high court has found that special 
circumstances diminish the importance of a government interest. 
B. The Defendant-Interest Prong and the Medically Appropriate 
Prong 
The Defendant-Interest Prong has resulted in the greatest 
divergence between the state high courts. In fact, the state high courts 
have found even more areas of disagreement than the federal courts, 
further expanding the number of Sell interpretations. This stands in
contrast with the Medically Appropriate Prong, which has received 
little attention. 
To start, several courts have adopted requirements consistent with 
the Elaborative Approach. The Oregon Supreme Court approvingly 
cited Fourth and Ninth Circuit cases for the propositions that “the 
government must make the required showing with respect to the 
particular defendant it seeks to medicate and that evidence that
antipsychotic medication generally reduces mentally ill patients’
100. Id. at 505–07; Warren, 778 S.E.2d at 761–62; Lopes, 322 P.3d at 527–28; Barzee, 177 P.3d
at 59; see Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166, 180 (2003) (instructing that whether “the defendant
has already been confined for a significant amount of time” may affect “the strength of the need
for prosecution”).
 101. Seekins, 8 A.3d at 505–07; Warren, 778 S.E.2d at 761–62; Barzee, 177 P.3d at 59.
 102. Lopes, 322 P.3d at 527. 
103. Id. at 528. In a footnote, the court suggested a new approach to the Sell analysis, in which 
the fifth step after assessing each of the prongs is to “evaluate all of the Sell factors in
combination” to determine if the government’s need to medicate overcomes the defendant’s
interest in avoiding unwanted medication. Id. at 528 n.28. The court declared that it would have
invalidated the Sell order under this combination-analysis step even if the Government-Interest
Prong had been satisfied. Id. While this looks similar to Justice Kennedy’s summation of the 
standard in Sell, see supra note 48 and accompanying text, no other court has applied it as a 
separate step of the analysis.
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delusional thought processes [is] insufficient to meet the ‘clear and
convincing’ standard.”104 The Georgia Supreme Court similarly looked 
to the Fourth Circuit in requiring an individualized and specific 
medication plan.105 The failure of the trial court to identify such a plan 
led to invalidation under the second, third, and fourth Sell prongs.106 
Other state high courts have embraced the Basic Approach. For 
example, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court refused to require a specific 
medication plan, finding that the federal support for that argument was 
unpersuasive.107 The court declined to address the “requisite level of 
specificity” for medication plans, as there was no need “to provide 
‘concrete details’ of particular medications and dosages.”108 Relatedly,
the Connecticut Supreme Court rejected the need for individualized 
evidence of medication efficacy, holding that “courts simply have no 
choice but to rely on generalized studies when making such predictive 
judgments.”109 Similarly, the Utah Supreme Court upheld the use of 
generalized reports and statistics when referenced by a doctor who 
personally examined the defendant, rejecting the dissent’s position that 
such analysis was insufficiently individualized.110 
Besides disagreeing about what it takes to satisfy the test, the state 
high courts also disagree on what the “substantially likely” and
“substantially unlikely” standards mean. The Connecticut Supreme
Court concluded that “‘substantially likely’ means more likely than
not, or a greater than 50 percent probability.”111 The Utah Supreme
Court disagreed, concluding that “[t]o the extent that such a likelihood 
104. Lopes, 322 P.3d at 529 (citing United States v. Ruiz-Gaxiola, 623 F.3d 684, 700 (9th Cir.
2010) and United States v. Bush, 585 F.3d 806, 816–17 (4th Cir. 2009)).
 105. Warren, 778 S.E.2d at 765 (citing, among others, United States v. Evans, 404 F.3d 227,
241 (4th Cir. 2005)). The Nevada Supreme Court also approvingly referenced a specific
medication plan in an order denying a petition for a writ of mandamus against a Sell order, though
the court did not engage in any real analysis of the Sell prongs. Lake v. Second Judicial Dist.
Court, ex rel. Cty. of Washoe, 281 P.3d 1193, at *1 (Nev. 2009) (unpublished table decision). 
106. Warren, 778 S.E.2d at 762–69. 
107. Commonwealth v. Sam, 952 A.2d 565, 580–81 (Pa. 2008) (rejecting an argument based
on Evans). 
108. Id. at 580.
109. State v. Wang, 145 A.3d 906, 920 (Conn. 2016) (“[I]f [general] studies do not bear on [the
defendant’s] particular medical condition, it seems unlikely that any academic literature short of
a paper devoted entirely to the treatment of the actual defendant in question would meet the
majority’s unexplained standard for ‘bearing’ on an incompetent defendant’s particular medical
condition.” (first alteration added) (quoting United States v. Watson, 793 F.3d 416, 441 (4th Cir.
2015) (Traxler, C.J., dissenting))). 
110. State v. Barzee, 177 P.3d 48, 78 (Utah 2007).
 111. Wang, 145 A.3d at 920.
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7532019] HOW THE STATES CAN FIX SELL 
can be quantified, it should reflect a probability of more than seventy 
percent.”112 In contrast, the New Mexico Supreme Court refused to set 
a numeric definition at all in order to avoid tempting “tailored expert 
testimonies.”113 Although the New Mexico court acknowledged that a
quantified approach provides objectivity and predictability, it found 
these benefits outweighed by the risk of experts improperly adjusting 
their testimony to meet the requirement.114 Instead, the court 
“prefer[red] that judges interpret meaningful medical testimony in the 
context of the applicable legal standards.”115 
The Medically Appropriate Prong has engendered little
controversy in the state high courts.116 The courts that have considered 
this prong have found it satisfied based on deference to the trial court’s 
determination of medical-expert credibility.117 The only exception is 
the Georgia Supreme Court, which found this prong unsatisfied in a 
case where no specific medication plan had been requested.118 No other 
state high court has elaborated on the requirements under the 
Medically Appropriate Prong.119 
C. State Intermediate Appellate Courts and Beyond 
Given the minimal engagement of the state high courts, it is worth 
looking to the state intermediate appellate courts to see if they are the 
true tip of the spear for state action on Sell. Unsurprisingly, the overall 
pattern confirms that the state intermediate appellate courts are 
engaging with the issue—at least under federal constitutional law. In 
those states where the state high court has not yet addressed Sell, the 
state intermediate appellate courts look to the federal circuit in which
112. Barzee, 177 P.3d at 61. After defining “substantially likely” as greater than 70 percent,
the court defined “substantially unlikely” as “a very low rate of occurrence.” Id.
113. State v. Cantrell, 179 P.3d 1214, 1221–22 (N.M. 2008). 
114. Id. 
115. Id. at 1222. 
116. The same is true of the Least-Invasive-Means Prong.
 117. See, e.g., Wang, 145 A.3d at 922–23 (agreeing with the trial court’s reliance on the 
government’s expert); Commonwealth v. Sam, 952 A.2d 565, 581–83 (Pa. 2008) (same).
118. Warren v. State, 778 S.E.2d, 768 (Ga. 2015).
119. The state courts have also generally followed the federal court consensus on the standard
of review and burden of proof. See, e.g., Wang, 145 A.3d at 915 (holding that the Government-
Interest Prong is a question of law and the remaining prongs are questions of fact); Warren, 778 
S.E.2d at 753 (holding that the government bears the burden of proof by clear and convincing
evidence).
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they sit as persuasive authority120 and usually end up applying Sell as 
implemented by that circuit.121 This has led to the same disparate
approaches as seen in the federal circuits. These courts do not appear 
to be adding additional novel requirements to what Sell requires but
instead are picking among existing federal interpretations.122 
This brief survey reveals two points. First, it is likely that more
state high courts will, as a practical matter, be forced to grapple with
these questions as they continue to develop in the lower state courts. 
Second, because the state courts have largely adopted the divergent
federal approaches to Sell, this divide will only deepen as more state 
courts take up this issue. Fixing this mess at the state level therefore 
requires answering two related and important questions: Who is 
getting Sell right as a matter of federal constitutional law, and how can 
states do better? 
IV. GETTING SELL RIGHT 
Criticisms of the Sell regime are prevalent. Yet most are focused
on the adequacy of the Sell standard for protecting individual rights.123 
This Note identifies a different issue—namely, how faithful Sell’s 
interpreters are to the original decision. This question is important for 
two reasons. First, when courts fail to follow Sell’s mandate, divergent 
approaches result. This should raise fears of courts straying from the
constitutional balance set forth by the Supreme Court. The other 
120. See, e.g., People v. Hodges, No. F068297, 2015 WL 9260576, at *4–5 (Cal. Ct. App. Dec. 
17, 2015) (vacating a medication order because the medical expert’s recommendation was “too
generic” to satisfy Sell, citing a Ninth Circuit case); City of Cleveland v. Tarver, No. 105522, 2017
WL 1179956, at *2–3 (Ohio Ct. App. Mar. 30, 2017) (reversing a Sell order due to the lack of an
important government interest in the prosecution of a defendant who stole a pack of cigarettes);
State v. Brewer, No. CA2008-04-040, 2008 WL 5053322, at *1–6 (Ohio Ct. App. Dec. 1, 2008)
(upholding a medication order by referencing Second, Fourth, and Sixth Circuit cases). 
121. See, e.g., Cotner v. Liwski, 403 P.3d 600, 604–08 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2017) (looking primarily 
to Ninth Circuit cases for Sell guidance); People ex rel. Hardesty, 410 P.3d 553, 556–57 (Colo. 
App. 2014) (looking primarily to Tenth Circuit cases for Sell guidance).
 122. Compare Cotner, 403 P.3d at 604–08 (employing the “rigorous analysis” of the
Elaborative Approach based on Ninth and Fourth Circuit cases), with State ex rel. K.M.E., No. 
12-11-00188-CV, 2011 WL 6000702, at *4–6 (Tex. App. Nov. 23, 2011) (applying only the basic 
language of the four Sell prongs and deferring to expert testimony on each prong).
 123. See, e.g., Susan A. McMahon, It Doesn’t Pass the Sell Test: Focusing on “The Facts of the 
Individual Case” in Involuntary Medication Inquiries, 50 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 387, 388 (2013)
(criticizing Sell as allowing involuntary medication to “become routine”); Elizabeth G. Schultz,
Note, Sell-ing Your Soul to the Courts: Forced Medication To Achieve Trial Competency in the 
Wake of Sell v. United States, 38 AKRON L. REV. 503, 530–49 (2005) (attributing constitutional
and normative problems to Sell). 













    
        
      
   
 
7552019] HOW THE STATES CAN FIX SELL 
obvious problem with this divergence—disuniformity in the law—is
one without a ready solution, or at least one that is unlikely to 
materialize anytime soon. The easy solution is, of course, another 
Supreme Court case, answering all questions and resolving disputes 
between the divergent approaches. But the Court has repeatedly
declined opportunities to do so.124 Although this could previously be
justified as waiting for further development of the law and the issues, 
it is no longer clear what the Court is waiting for. 
Second, the different federal interpretations raise questions about 
the proper judicial role in the involuntary-medication regime. If the 
Basic Approach is wrong, it essentially constitutes abdication of courts’ 
constitutional role as protectors of individual rights. That would mean
these courts are undermining defendants’ constitutionally protected 
liberty interests by failing to enforce constitutional constraints. If the
Elaborative Approach is wrong, its additional requirements constitute 
improper judicial policymaking that inappropriately impedes the 
government’s important interest in prosecution. That policymaking 
raises institutional competence concerns, as judges are ill-suited to
second-guess medical opinions. Moreover, the decision to impose
additional protections not required by Sell should be one made by the 
branch with a political mandate for policymaking, not by judges.125 
Assuming that the Court will not soon resolve these issues, this 
Note addresses the more difficult issue of how to proceed with Sell until 
the Court steps back in. This Part deciphers Sell and recommends the 
interpretation that the state courts should be following. 
A. Why It Matters 
If the question is “who is getting Sell right?” the answer cannot be 
“everyone.” As the Sell framework is based on interest balancing, any 
change to that framework upsets the balance that the Supreme Court 
has mandated as required by the Constitution. Sell is thus exclusive of 
all additional elaboration. That means that either the Basic Approach 
or the Elaborative Approach courts (or both) are getting Sell wrong. 
The main distinction between the Basic and Elaborative 
Approaches is that the latter imposes certain requirements that go 
124. See United States v. Claflin, 670 F. App’x 372 (5th Cir. 2016), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 1361 
(2017); United States v. Pfeifer, 661 F. App’x 618 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 412 (2016). 
125. Although many state judges are elected and thus more politically accountable than
federal judges, that is not the case for all state judges. And even elected judges are not charged
with express policymaking.
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beyond what is required by a plain-text reading of Sell. These 
additional flourishes are likely judicial divinations of implied
requirements or policy judgments of what the Sell standard should be.
This Note does not fault the courts for their varying interpretations of
Sell, as each is likely doing its best to implement an admittedly vague 
standard. But even if all courts are trying to faithfully implement Sell 
as they interpret it, additional requirements that are not rooted in Sell 
are inappropriate for courts to impose and threaten to undermine Sell’s 
constitutional balance.
Courts implementing Sell—whether they be lower federal courts 
or state courts applying federal law under the Supremacy Clause— 
must apply the law as set forth by the Supreme Court. The Sell Court 
announced what the Due Process Clause requires in this context, and 
lower courts have no authority to change that standard. This is 
especially important where the Court’s standard is a balancing test, 
where new requirements imposed on one side will upset the balance
the Court found to be required by the Constitution. Ultimately, 
ignoring Sell requirements—or adding new ones—contravenes the 
Supreme Court’s guidance. 
Discerning the precise balance that the Sell Court struck is the 
focus of this Part, which begins by examining the three requirements 
imposed under the Elaborative Approach: the specific medication 
plan, the “exacting focus” on the particular defendant, and the detailed
treatment plan.126 Comparing the Elaborative Approach requirements 
to the Sell opinion itself reveals that while the specific medication plan
has support in the basis and reasoning of Sell, the latter two
requirements do not and thus should not be grafted onto the Sell 
framework. 
B. The Specific Medication Plan 
The specific-medication-plan requirement provides that the
proposed Sell order must include the type of drugs to be used, their
dosage, and the expected duration of the defendant’s exposure. The 
debate over this requirement arises because Sell does not directly 
speak to the level of specificity required in the treatment plan.127 
However, the Sell opinion sufficiently indicates that the Court found 
126. See supra Part II.B.2. 
127. United States v. Hernandez-Vasquez, 513 F.3d 908, 916 (9th Cir. 2008).
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that Due Process does require such specificity in the identification of 
medications. 
Unlike most Sell dilemmas, the Court’s opinion resolves this 
question. The Court confirmed the need for specific medication
identification while setting out the Medically Appropriate Prong: “The
specific kinds of drugs at issue may matter here as elsewhere. Different 
kinds of antipsychotic drugs may produce different side effects and 
enjoy different levels of success.”128 The Court reaffirmed that 
emphasis elsewhere in the opinion, referencing “the medical 
appropriateness of a particular course of antipsychotic drug
treatment”129 and “[w]hether a particular drug” will interfere with the
defendant’s ability to participate in his own defense.130 Thus, the
specific-medication-plan requirement is not just consistent with the Sell 
opinion but mandated by it.
Moreover, requiring this specificity is necessary as a matter of 
common sense. Unless the court is aware of which drugs are to be given 
to the defendant, it would be impossible to make the factual findings 
required by the Defendant-Interest and Medically Appropriate
Prongs.131 Reviewing involuntary medication in general would focus 
the judicial inquiry at a level of abstraction that would render such 
review meaningless.132 And while the specificity requirement imposes
a constraint on the government, it is one that is easy to satisfy. Most 
mentally ill criminal defendants are treated from a small suite of 
antipsychotic drugs determined by their particular condition.133 
Further, this requirement still allows for needed flexibility, as doctors 
can return to the court for an updated order if particular medications 
are unsuccessful at restoration.134 In sum, uniformly imposing this 
requirement will not constitute an undue constraint on the government
but will only inform the court’s decision and ensure that the Sell 
128. Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166, 181 (2003).
 129. Id. at 183 (emphasis added).
 130. Id. at 185 (emphasis added).
131. United States v. Evans, 404 F.3d 227, 241 (4th Cir. 2005).
 132. Id. 
133. Cochrane et al., supra note 9, at 110 & tbl.2 (finding only eight medication options were
used to treat 132 defendants, and further noting that four medication options were used to treat 
all but fifteen of these defendants).
 134. See Evans, 404 F.3d at 241 (“We believe that this approach best balances the need for
effective judicial review with the need to give prison medical staff the flexibility subtly to modify
their proposed course of treatment to fit the defendant’s individual medical condition if the 
treatment does not work exactly as initially expected.”). 
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standard is truly satisfied.135 Thus, the specific medication plan
comports both with the general goals of Sell and with the language of
the opinion.
C. An Exacting Focus on the Particular Defendant 
While specific medication plans may be required by Sell, other 
portions of the Elaborative Approach are not, starting with the 
exacting-focus requirement. Although necessary to a certain extent, 
this requirement has been taken too far by certain courts. This 
emphasis originated in United States v. Evans,136 in which the Fourth
Circuit vacated a medication order in part for failing to focus on the 
defendant as an individual.137 The court found data on a medication’s 
general efficacy alone insufficient to demonstrate its likelihood of 
success in treating the particular defendant.138 This reasoning is 
uncontroversial as applied to the facts in Evans, where the government 
made no reference at all to the individual conditions of the defendant
and how medication might affect him specifically.139 This is a clear 
violation of Sell, as the Medically Appropriate Prong requires a 
determination that medication be “in the patient’s best medical interest 
in light of his medical condition.”140 
However, when read broadly, the Evans language can be used to
raise the Sell bar to a point where it is impossible to satisfy for certain 
defendants. This argument combines the exacting focus on the 
defendant and Evans’ rejection of the syllogism that medication 
effective in general is likely to be effective on the particular 
defendant.141 Specifically, defendants can successfully argue that 
absent specific, individualized evidence that medication is substantially 
likely to be effective on the particular defendant—such as his past 
successful medication—the government fails to satisfy its burden under 
135. As the Evans court explained:
To approve of a treatment plan without knowing the proposed medication and dose 
range would give prison medical staff carte blanche to experiment with what might
even be dangerous drugs or dangerously high dosages of otherwise safe drugs and
would not give defense counsel and experts a meaningful ability to challenge the 
propriety of the proposed treatment.
Id.
 136. Id. at 227.
 137. Id. at 242.
 138. Id. at 241.
 139. Id.
140. Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166, 181 (2003) (emphasis added).
 141. See supra note 86 and accompanying text.
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the Defendant-Interest Prong.142 This raises the question of how 
specific such evidence must be. 
For some courts, even personal examination of a defendant by a 
medical expert may not suffice. For example, in United States v. Bush,143 
the Fourth Circuit reviewed a medication order that was partly based
on a study which found a high restoration rate for individuals with the
defendant’s rare mental disorder.144 The district court had approved
medication based on a medical expert’s recommendation which relied
partly on the study and partly on his personal interaction with the 
defendant and review of her previous psychiatric care.145 On review,
the Fourth Circuit decided that only some individuals in the study were 
truly relevant—those who had suffered similar periods of untreated 
psychosis as the defendant.146 Because the cited study included only
four such individuals, the court questioned the sufficiency of the 
expert’s testimony.147 Examples like these raise concerns of 
micromanagement by appellate courts and a focus on evidence that
may not exist. 
Sell does mandate consideration of the particular defendant and 
the impact that medication will have on him via the Medically 
Appropriate Prong’s reference to the defendant’s medical condition.148 
But to extrapolate from this a rejection of generalized evidence would 
take Evans too far and risk turning prior successful medication of the
defendant into a necessary condition. Such an artificial prerequisite 
would categorically preclude medication for many defendants that Sell 
itself would otherwise allow. 
This approach suffers from additional flaws. First, it is hard to
imagine how any individualized assessment would not be based at least 
partly on science that speaks only in generalities. For many defendants 
who have never been previously treated, the only evidence that a drug
is likely to work on them is the syllogism—rejected in Evans—that
142. See State v. Lopes, 322 P.3d 512, 529–30 (Or. 2014) (expressing concern about the trial
court’s finding that the Defendant-Interest Prong was satisfied in part based on a general study 
of medication efficacy).
143. United States v. Bush, 585 F.3d 806 (4th Cir. 2009).
 144. Id. at 816.
 145. Id. at 812.
 146. Id. at 816.
 147. Id. at 812, 816. 
148. Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166, 181–82 (2003).
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generally effective medication is likely to be effective for them.149 As 
long as an expert’s personal examination is sufficient to identify any
individualized reason that the general efficacy would be inapplicable 
to a particular defendant—such as a physiological condition that might 
make the medication dangerous or ineffective—personal examination
and generalized medication-efficacy evidence should be sufficient. If
that is enough for a medical expert to conclude that restoration is 
substantially likely, and the trial court concurs, appellate courts should
defer to that judgment under the clear error standard of review. 
Second, the exacting focus may be much ado about nothing. One 
statistical study on Sell orders quantified characteristics predictive of
restoration.150 The study found that the individual characteristics 
considered so vital by the Elaborative Approach—primary diagnosis, 
drug type, route of administration, age, and race—were not statistically
relevant predictors of the success of restoration-to-competence
treatments.151 In fact, the study found that “it took less time for 
symptom relief and competency restoration for older versus younger 
defendants,”152 which refutes the importance that the Bush court 
placed on duration of the disorder.153 Across the cases studied,
antipsychotics were generally effective in restoring competency (79 
percent success rate), notwithstanding individual characteristics.154 
This not only supports a more generalized reading of the required focus 
on the defendant’s medical condition, consistent with the basic 
language of Sell, but also allows for expert reliance on general 
medication effectiveness.
D. The Detailed Treatment Plan 
The Elaborative Approach’s detailed treatment plan requires that 
the government: estimate restoration time, probable benefits, and side 
effects; justify its proposed course of treatment; and conduct a cost-
149. See, e.g., United States v. Diaz, 630 F.3d 1314, 1333 (11th Cir. 2011) (rejecting the
defendant’s argument that the government could not meet its burden of proof because the 
defendant has no “history of responding to anti-psychotic medication”).
 150. Cochrane et al., supra note 9.
 151. Id. at 113.
 152. Id. The authors did note, however, that they had insufficient data on the duration of the 
disorder as opposed to age and that it was “possible that the older defendants in the treatment 
cohort had a more recent acute-onset type of psychotic disorder or had more complete histories 
of past medication treatment responses to guide current effective treatment interventions.” Id. at
113–14. 
153. See supra notes 143–46 and accompanying text.
 154. Cochrane et al., supra note 9, at 113. 

























    
   
7612019] HOW THE STATES CAN FIX SELL 
benefit analysis for medication.155 These requirements are the 
byproduct of a legal regime where judges are forced to decide an
issue—whether medication is medically appropriate—that is better left
to medical experts.  
Further, these requirements do not have support in the holding or 
reasoning of Sell. Although this treatment information might be 
helpful to the reviewing court and a good idea as a policy matter, it 
requires interpreting “medically appropriate” to mean a lot more than
it says. In effect, these enhanced requirements call for the reviewing
court to dictate what is “medically appropriate” to the medical expert.
But Sell itself only defines “medically appropriate” to mean “in the 
patient’s best medical interest in light of his medical condition.”156 The
Supreme Court could have set out more detailed and elaborate criteria
but instead chose to leave this determination to the medical experts 
and the trial court. Accordingly, it is inappropriate for appellate courts 
to impose their own views that go beyond the announced standard. 
And while some of this information is already encompassed within 
other parts of the Sell standard—such as consideration of side-effect
risks—other information just might not be available, such as estimated
restoration time.157 It is unclear how an expert is supposed to provide 
information that might not exist and whether the reviewing court is 
supposed to reject all medication requests if any piece of information
is missing. While an appellate court has a role in reviewing these
judgments, that role involves clear error review only, which is hard to 
comport with these additional requirements. 
It is understandable for courts to want to require specifics to be 
able to review expert judgments. To some extent, requiring specifics is 
permissible under Sell: the trial court ultimately bears responsibility for 
gauging whether medication is “medically appropriate” and must 
assess the credibility of medical expert witnesses. But the Supreme
Court has already recognized in this context that rigorous judicial 
scrutiny of medical judgments is not constitutionally required and not 
always desirable.158 In Harper, the Court held that “[n]otwithstanding 
155. See supra Part II.B.2. 
156. Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166, 181 (2003).
157. In a study of all federal criminal defendants involuntarily medicated under Sell between 
2003 and 2009, the only significant predictor of treatment duration was age, with older patients
requiring shorter periods of medication before restoration to competency. The median
restoration period was 126 days, but some defendants were restored to competency in less than a 
month and others took more than a year. Cochrane et al., supra note 9, at 113.
158. Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 231 (1990).
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762 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 69:735
the risks” of involuntary medication, an individual’s “interests are
adequately protected, and perhaps better served, by allowing the 
decision to medicate to be made by medical professionals rather than 
a judge.”159 
Overall, these requirements involve appellate courts taking it 
upon themselves to determine what it means to be “medically 
appropriate,” but that is a determination better left to the discretion of 
medical experts and the trial judges who hear their testimony. What
was true in Harper is true in Sell: medical professionals are better
judges of “medical appropriateness” than judges.160 The imposition of 
the detailed treatment plan in all cases morphs the Medically 
Appropriate Prong into something else, changing the Sell balance. 
E. The Bigger Issue: “Unsavory” and “Disfavored” Sell Orders 
The Elaborative Approach is not just a different reading of Sell. 
Instead, it is symptomatic of a hostility toward Sell orders that 
originated in the federal courts and is spreading to the state courts.161 
This hostility is best summed up by the courts themselves, who 
proclaim that “Sell orders are disfavored”162 and “carry an unsavory
pedigree.”163 Certain circuits have internalized this antipathy and 
infused it throughout the Sell inquiry, imposing stricter scrutiny of 
expert testimony than would otherwise be called for by clear error 
review.164 But while Sell orders might be “unsavory” in certain circuits,
the Supreme Court showed no such animosity in its own opinion. 
159. Id.
160. Not everyone agrees with this point. See generally Samantha Godwin, Bad Science Makes
Bad Law: How the Deference Afforded to Psychiatry Undermines Civil Liberties, 10 SEATTLE J.
SOC. JUST. 647 (2012) (arguing that judicial deference to psychiatric expert witnesses is
“incompatible with broader due process and civil rights concerns”).
 161. See Warren v. State, 778 S.E.2d 749, 764 (Ga. 2015) (“We would hope that the State’s
physicians, as healthcare professionals, would not misuse such unfettered authority, but history
teaches that involuntary medical treatment, especially of the poor, the outcast, and the
incarcerated, is worthy of close and independent oversight.” (citing United States v. Watson, 793 
F.3d 416, 419 (4th Cir. 2015) for the proposition that Sell orders “carry an unsavory pedigree”)).
162. United States v. Rivera-Guerrero, 426 F.3d 1130, 1137 (9th Cir. 2005).
163. United States v. Chatmon, 718 F.3d 369, 374 (4th Cir. 2013).
 164. See, e.g., United States v. Ruiz-Gaxiola, 623 F.3d 684, 696 (9th Cir. 2010) (“There is a 
compelling need . . . for the district court to make factual findings so that the defendant may be
assured that the trial court has conducted the stringent review mandated in light of the substantial
infringement on his liberty interests . . . .”); United States v. Evans, 404 F.3d 227, 240 (4th Cir.
2005) (“While the [trial court’s accepted] report does indeed state that involuntary medication
would ‘significantly further’ the Government’s interests and be ‘medically appropriate’ for Evans,
it failed to explain how it reached its conclusions . . . .”); see also State v. Lopes, 322 P.3d 512, 524 
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7632019] HOW THE STATES CAN FIX SELL 
The courts that have followed this approach often reference two 
phrases in Sell for support. The first is that Sell orders should be or will 
be “rare.”165 But the Sell Court actually said, “[t]his standard will 
permit involuntary administration of drugs solely for trial competence 
purposes in certain instances. But those instances may be rare. That is 
because the standard [requires] . . . .”166 The Court then announced the
four-pronged test.167 What reads more as a prediction—“may be 
rare”—has been turned into more of a command—“should be rare.” 
That is a misreading of Sell. The Sell Court approved of involuntary 
medication so long as the four prongs are satisfied. If they are, Sell 
orders are constitutionally approved, as they strike the appropriate 
balance of government interest against individual rights. While the
defendant’s liberty interest is important, the Court also recognized that 
the societal “need for prosecution” of “an individual accused of a 
serious crime is important” and “substantial,” based on “the basic
human need for security.”168 Therefore, courts that disfavor Sell orders 
favor the individual defendant at the expense of society. 
Moreover, the Court’s prediction of “rarity” is accurate, without 
the need for increased judicial policing. “Of roughly 90,000 criminal
defendants processed through the federal court system each
year . . . . only 287 requests for involuntary treatment were made over
a 6-year period of time (approximately 60 per year).”169 Thus, even if 
every single request had been approved, Sell orders would only occur 
in one out of every 1500 cases (0.06 percent). In reality, more than half 
of requests were denied over that time period, such that only about
twenty-five defendants were forcibly medicated each year, or 
approximately one in every 3600 cases (0.03 percent).170 “Rare” does 
not mean that courts should be hostile to those cases that do pass the 
Sell test. 
The second phrase that these courts reference to justify Sell’s 
“disfavored” status is the Sell Court’s reference to Harper. According 
(Or. 2014) (emphasizing the need for “thorough consideration and justification” and “especially 
careful scrutiny” (quoting Ruiz-Gaxiola, 623 F.3d at 692)).
165. United States v. White, 620 F.3d 401, 422 (4th Cir. 2010) (concluding that medication was
inappropriate where it would “would risk making ‘routine’ the kind of drastic resort to forced
medication for restoring competency that the Supreme Court gave no hint of approving in Sell”).
166. Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166, 180 (2003).
 167. Id. at 180–83. 
168. Id. at 180.
 169. Cochrane et al., supra note 9, at 114. 
170. Id. There is no reason to expect these rates to differ significantly in state courts.
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to the Court, the Harper inquiry—which asks whether involuntary 
medication is justified by the danger posed by the mentally ill criminal
defendant—should usually come before Sell, as the Harper analysis is 
“usually more ‘objective and manageable’” than the Sell test.171 But
again, that does not mean that Sell is “disfavored”—Sell is perfectly 
appropriate when the Harper analysis fails and the Sell balance is 
satisfied. The Court also suggested undertaking the Harper analysis 
first because it would help inform the Sell analysis.172 Therefore, that 
reasoning should not be distorted to “disfavor” Sell. 
This judicial hostility may reflect doubt about the soundness of the 
balance struck by the Sell Court—concerns which are echoed in the 
academic literature.173 The increased scrutiny and additional 
requirements of the Elaborative Approach might best be explained as
courts trying to give potency to the Defendant-Interest, Least-
Invasive-Means, and Medically Appropriate Prongs, which have been
criticized for “overemphasiz[ing] the questions surrounding the 
efficacy of the medication and its side effects, which will almost always 
be decided in the government’s favor.”174 Because the current 
generation of antipsychotic medications is generally effective and has 
less risky side effects than similar drugs in the Sell era, a
straightforward application of these prongs might turn Sell into a 
rubber-stamp so long as the defendant committed a serious crime.175 
While these are legitimate concerns, the federal circuits are not 
the right institutions to be judging the continued appropriateness of the
Supreme Court’s standard. Nor are the state courts, so long as they are 
analyzing the Sell inquiry as a matter of federal constitutional law.
However, if the states determine that Sell no longer provides an
adequate balance, state high courts and state legislatures could look to
state-specific alternative paths to reform Sell. The next Part explores 
those paths.
171. Sell, 539 U.S. at 182 (quoting Riggins v. Nevada, 504 U.S. 127, 140 (1992) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring)).
 172. Id. at 183 (“Even if a court decides medication cannot be authorized on the alternative
grounds, the findings underlying such a decision will help to inform expert opinion and judicial
decisionmaking in respect to a request to administer drugs for trial competence purposes.”).
 173. See supra note 123.
 174. McMahon, supra note 123, at 405. 
175. See id. at 405–07 (finding that ten years after Sell, “medications generally work and 
generally are not accompanied by uncontrollable side effects”).
KATZ IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 11/18/2019 10:02 AM        
  
















   
  
    
   
 
7652019] HOW THE STATES CAN FIX SELL 
V. STATE-SPECIFIC ALTERNATIVE PATHS TO SELL REFORM
So far, we have seen that state courts have followed—and are 
likely to continue to follow—in the paths of the federal circuits,
imposing requirements on involuntary-medication orders not 
mandated by Sell. Courts have applied Sell inconsistently, and some
courts and many commentators consider Sell inadequate protection for 
defendants’ rights. The following sections consider how, rather than 
continued judicial divergence within the Sell interpretations, state
constitutions and state statutes might provide alternative paths to Sell 
reform. 
Unlike in the federal circuits, state courts have other sources of 
law they can look to in Sell cases: state constitutional law and state 
statutes. Getting Sell right in the states thus requires looking to how 
those state-specific sources of law have played a role so far and whether 
that might—or should—change in the future. The first Section reveals
that state constitutions have yet to serve as a source of additional 
protections for Sell defendants. It then concludes that change in that
field is unlikely. But that does not mean that the states are helpless.
The second Section proposes a better avenue for progress in the Sell
regime: state legislative action. 
A. The Likely Inapplicability of State Constitutional Law 
In addition to the Basic and Elaborative approaches, state high
courts may choose a third option: finding additional protections as a 
matter of state constitutional law. While lower federal courts are bound
by Sell as both a floor and a ceiling for the analysis of involuntary-
medication orders,176 the state high courts are less restricted—at least 
in principle. Although the states may not lessen federal constitutional 
protections, they can and do find additional civil rights protections in
state constitutions.177 
Unfortunately for criminal defendants, state courts have yet to 
turn to state constitutional law to expand protections beyond the Sell 
regime. Most of the state cases make no mention of their respective
state constitutions. Two use footnotes to dispose of the defendants’ 
176. As noted above, however, federal courts have not uniformly respected the bounds laid
down by the Supreme Court.
 177. See generally  JEFFREY S. SUTTON, 51 IMPERFECT SOLUTIONS: STATES AND THE 
MAKING OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (2018) (describing the important role state 
constitutional law has played in protecting individual rights).
KATZ IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 11/18/2019 10:02 AM        
















   
 




    
  




766 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 69:735
state constitutional claims.178 Getting a little closer to the issue, the 
Utah Supreme Court recognized a defendant’s state constitutional
argument as a prelude to the Sell analysis but declined to address it due
to the defendant’s failure to preserve the argument.179 Although the 
court acknowledged the possibility that the state constitution provides 
additional protections, it concluded that it must “wait for another day 
to determine whether Utah’s constitution forbids” Sell orders.180 The
Pennsylvania Supreme Court has been the sole state high court to 
engage substantially with the Sell standard as a matter of state 
constitutional law, and it concluded that the state constitution did not 
provide any additional protection.181 
So why might states be hesitant to engage in state constitutional 
analysis in this context? Previous movements in state constitutional law
were in large part motivated by “a trend in recent opinions of the 
United States Supreme Court to pull back from . . . the 
enforcement . . . of the federal Bill of Rights and the restraints of the
due process and equal protection clauses.”182 Facing that lack of federal
protection, state courts could fill the void with state constitutional 
protections.183 But here, the Supreme Court has already acted and has 
provided a level of constitutional protection. Thus, rather than a void 
for state courts to fill, there is an affirmative action by the Supreme
Court setting forth a balancing test to protect individual interests. 
In the absence of federal constitutional protections, state high
courts might have felt compelled to provide state constitutional 
protections for criminal defendants.184 But the Court’s prior entry into 
the field will likely preclude divergent state constitutional action, as
state courts will conclude either that the Sell standard is the 
appropriate balance, or that even if it is not the right balance, the
Supreme Court has spoken and it would be inappropriate for the state 
178. Warren v. State, 778 S.E.2d 749, 752 n.3 (Ga. 2015) (declining to address the defendant’s
arguments under the Georgia Constitution because they were not sufficiently raised at trial); State
v. Lopes, 322 P.3d 512, 528 n.29 (Or. 2014) (noting that because it was vacating under the federal
Sell standard, it did not need to “reach or discuss” an amicus argument based on the Oregon
Constitution).
179. State v. Barzee, 177 P.3d 48, 55 (Utah 2007).
 180. Id.
181. Commonwealth v. Sam, 952 A.2d 565, 585–88 (Pa. 2008).
182. William J. Brennan, Jr., State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights, 90 
HARV. L. REV. 489, 495 (1977).
 183. Id.
 184. See, e.g., SUTTON, supra note 177, at 22–42 (describing state court action to protect
education rights after the Supreme Court declined to recognize a fundamental right to education).

















   




   
    
  
     
   
 
7672019] HOW THE STATES CAN FIX SELL 
high court to contradict the Court. To do otherwise would expose the 
state court to criticism that it essentially “adopt[ed] the dissenting view 
in [Sell] and label[ed] it state constitutional law.”185 
But even where the Supreme Court has directly spoken on an
issue, certain objective considerations might compel a state court to 
diverge from federal law. These considerations can rationalize and
justify this divergence and mitigate legitimacy concerns.186 As only one
state has fully considered the state constitution in this context,187 this is 
a wide-open area of law. It is thus worthwhile to consider application 
of these considerations to Sell to determine the likelihood of future 
action on this front. While these criteria vary by state, they may include
some variation on the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s consideration of 
(1) state constitutional text, (2) state constitutional history, (3) related
case law from other jurisdictions, and (4) policy considerations and 
unique local concerns.188 While this Note cannot address the likelihood 
of successfully finding additional protections in any particular state
constitution, these criteria suggest that state constitutions are unlikely
to provide much in the way of additional protection. 
First, a critical part of the state constitutional analysis will be
identifying any textual hook that might allow divergence from Sell. 
Although Sell was based on the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process 
Clause, defendants could also claim protection under state analogs to
the Fourth Amendment189 or Sixth Amendment.190 While a Fourth
Amendment analog claim was unsuccessful in Commonwealth v. 
Sam,191 the Pennsylvania Supreme Court noted that the state 
constitutional provision was “materially identical” to the federal 
provision.192 In contrast, in a related context, Louisiana and South 
Carolina recognized state constitutional prohibitions on forced
185. Goodwin Liu, Brennan Lecture: State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual
Rights: A Reappraisal, 92 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1307, 1316 (2017); accord id. (“The problem is not that 
state court decisions departing from federal precedent are unreasoned or results-oriented. It is
that the reasons for departing [may] seem illegitimate . . . .”).
 186. See id. at 1314 (describing how state courts have justified divergence).
 187. See supra notes 178–80 and accompanying text.
188. Commonwealth v. Sam, 952 A.2d 565, 585 (Pa. 2008).
 189. Id. at 585–86. 
190. State v. Maryott, 492 P.2d 239, 240, 242–45 (Wash. Ct. App. 1971) (reversing a conviction
based on a finding that the state’s forcible administration of drugs affected the defendant’s ability
to participate in his defense at trial, thus violating his Sixth Amendment right to confront 
witnesses against him). 
191. Sam, 952 A.2d at 565.
 192. Id. at 585–86.  
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medication to render competence for execution, based in part on
language that explicitly protects against unreasonable invasions of 
privacy.193 Thus, a state with such a constitutional provision might have 
a textual justification for divergence from Sell. 
The second critical consideration focuses on state-specific history
and tradition which might justify divergence.194 This may be an uphill 
battle for a criminal defendant. The Sell Court made no mention of the 
history or tradition of refusing unwanted medication, despite having 
done so in related contexts.195 Finding such material for a particular 
state would be difficult, if not impossible.196 Moreover, for better or
worse, involuntary treatment of the mentally ill is a part of this 
country’s history,197 and Sell has further legitimized it in at least one
context. As states continue to implement the Sell doctrine and develop 
a tradition of involuntary medication, it will become even harder for a
state high court to override Sell as a matter of state constitutional 
law.198 If a state high court was committed to a prohibition against 
forced medication in the trial-competence context, the best time to 
prohibit it as a matter of state constitutional law would have been 
immediately after Sell. Logically, the longer states operate under Sell, 
the more acceptable the practice becomes as a matter of tradition and
the less likely it is to be completely overridden.199 
193. Louisiana v. Perry, 610 So. 2d 746, 755 (La. 1992) (quoting LA. CONST. art. I, § 5);
Singleton v. State, 437 S.E.2d 53, 61 (S.C. 1993) (quoting S.C. CONST. art I, § 10).
 194. SUTTON, supra note 177, at 16–18. 
195. See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 723 (1997) (referring to “this Nation’s
history and constitutional traditions” and discussing “the common-law rule that forced
medication was a battery, and the long legal tradition protecting the decision to refuse unwanted
medical treatment”).
196. What are the state-specific historical roots of forced medication of criminal defendants?
Are there any? Will they be possible to find? What would the writers of the state constitution
think of forced medication? Is there a meaningful way to engage with that question? See Liu,
supra note 185, at 1321 (“[M]any provisions of state constitutions do not lend themselves to state-
specific understandings.”).
 197. See, e.g., Elizabeth Bennion, A Right To Remain Psychotic? A New Standard for
Involuntary Treatment in Light of Current Science, 47 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 251, 266–71 (2013)
(describing the legal battles over involuntary treatment between the 1960s and 1980s). 
198. Of course, while a tradition of involuntary medication cuts against state constitutional
divergence under this framework, not all courts adhere to this framework, and there are plenty of
modern examples of courts contradicting long-standing traditions. See, e.g., Goodridge v. Dep’t
of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 968 (Mass. 2003) (becoming the first state high court to recognize
a state constitutional right to same-sex marriage).
 199. Cf. Andersen v. King Cty., 138 P.3d 963, 978, 985 (Wash. 2006) (rejecting a claimed state
constitutional right to same-sex marriage, based in part on the lack of a history or tradition for
recognizing that right in the state).

















     
   
 
  
   
7692019] HOW THE STATES CAN FIX SELL 
Finally, practical considerations also decrease the likelihood of a 
state high court recognizing constitutional protections beyond Sell. As 
a matter of administrability, it is much easier for a state court to simply
look to federal law and apply it: the Sell standard is well developed and 
the various existing interpretations allow a state high court to mold Sell 
as it sees fit without having to take the drastic step of crafting a new 
standard or identifying a complete prohibition in the state 
constitution.200 Thus, the diversity of federal interpretations means the
states do not have to look to state constitutional law to change the 
test—they can just change it by reference to federal law. Ultimately, 
the Supreme Court has already announced a largely satisfactory 
standard that adequately balances the government’s interest in 
prosecution against the individual’s interest in avoiding forced
medication.201 
B. A Better Way 
Absent Supreme Court intervention, there is little hope for a 
uniform Sell standard across federal circuits. And with various federal
circuit interpretations to choose from, state high courts have only 
increased the divergence in their interpretation and implementation of 
Sell. However, all is not lost. While uniformity is a forlorn hope,
improvements to the Sell regime can be made in the states. But those 
improvements should come not from the judicial improvisation that led
courts astray in the first place, but instead from state legislatures. 
While this approach will not result in uniformity across states, it
would result in a more structured and meaningful Sell regime in each 
state, as legislatures can resolve any perceived failings of Sell and 
determine if additional protections are needed as a matter of policy. 
Although the ultimate determination of whether involuntary
medication is constitutional resides with the courts, the legislatures are 
better suited to establish the detailed framework of the decision-
making process. Of course, state legislatures could not reduce 
protections below Sell, but they could turn the Sell standard into a more
structured regime, clarifying the prongs and what is required of the
government to satisfy them. Moreover, if such changes are the product 
200. See Liu, supra note 185, at 1315 (“In practice, it is common for state courts, in deciding a
state constitutional issue involving equal protection, due process, or search and seizure, to center
the analysis primarily on federal law.”).
 201. See, e.g., Cochrane et al., supra note 9, at 115 (noting the high restoration rate in Sell 
cases and concluding that “the Sell criteria can be considered a ‘clear and convincing’ success”).
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of political pressures, state legislatures are the proper policymaking 
branch to make those decisions.
As a threshold matter, the state high courts should faithfully 
adhere to Sell and should avoid following the Elaborative Approach 
aspects that have imposed additional requirements not supported by 
Sell.202 This means imposing the basic Sell prongs as described, as well 
as the specific medication plan of particular medications, dosage 
ranges, and duration of medication.203 Overall, the Sell opinion sets 
forth what is constitutionally required, and statistics show that forced 
medication is effective at restoring competency.204 Lower courts might 
disagree with forced medication as a policy matter, but the Supreme 
Court has announced that it is constitutional and appropriate when the
Sell standard is satisfied: state high courts should honor that by giving
effect to Sell, not disfavoring it. Instead of judicial elaborations, state
legislatures should be the source of any additional requirements or 
protections imposed on involuntary-medication orders.  
Several states have already attempted to do so but have failed to
meaningfully alter the Sell paradigm. For example, California has
enacted a statute authorizing state courts to order involuntary 
medication of criminal defendants, but in doing so, it merely repeated
the Sell prongs almost verbatim.205 This sort of statute provides no
guidance, forcing state courts to turn to the complicated federal Sell 
regime for answers.206 This missed opportunity is also reflected in the 
state case law, where state statutes have yet to play a meaningful role 
in the state high courts’ Sell cases.207 
202. See supra Part IV.A. 
203. Id. 
204. See Cochrane et al., supra note 9, at 115 (finding that a data set “provides empirical
evidence of favorable outcomes following involuntary treatment for restoration of competency”). 
205. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1370(a)(2)(B)(i)(III) (West 2018). 
206. See generally, e.g., State v. Seekins, 8 A.3d 491 (Conn. 2010) (hearing a case pursuant to
state statute on involuntary medication but deciding the case solely by reference to federal case
law).
207. Most state high courts considering Sell have barely engaged with state statutes. See State 
v. Lopes, 322 P.3d 512, 517 (Or. 2014) (“Unlike many states, Oregon has not enacted statutes that
explicitly grant trial courts authority to enter Sell orders or that implement the Court’s decision
in Sell.”); Commonwealth v. Sam, 952 A.2d 565, 583–85 (Pa. 2008) (rejecting an application of the
mental-health statute in the postconviction context and thus not addressing how it might affect
the court’s Sell analysis); see also Warren v. State, 778 S.E.2d 749 (Ga. 2015) (making no mention
of any applicable state statute); State v. Cantrell, 179 P.3d 1214 (N.M. 2008) (same); State v.
Barzee, 177 P.3d 48 (Utah 2007) (same). Connecticut does have legislation authorizing
medication in this context, but it was enacted before Sell was decided. State v. Wang, 145 A.3d 
906, 915 n.7 (Conn. 2016). The Connecticut Supreme Court has looked to Sell and its progeny to














   
  




    




      
 
     
  
 
7712019] HOW THE STATES CAN FIX SELL 
Instead of simply codifying the existing vague standard, state 
legislatures should embrace the opportunity to provide guidance to the 
courts. For example, courts assess Sell’s Government-Interest Prong by 
looking to penal codes in various ways to measure the “seriousness” of 
a crime, under the rationale that “the substantial sentences attached to
the charged offenses reflects a policy decision by [the legislature] that 
the crimes are serious ones.”208 This reasoning supports a greater role
for state legislatures in developing the Sell regime, as the courts have 
acknowledged “a recognition of and respect for the fundamental role 
of the legislative process in making these seriousness determinations, 
as well as an effort to find some objective standard by which to analyze 
the first Sell factor.”209 
Yet merely having penal codes does not provide sufficient 
guidance for the courts, as judges must still make subjective decisions 
about how to measure “seriousness” within the penal codes.210 Instead,
state legislatures should articulate what they consider to be a “serious 
crime” in this context.211 While the first Sell prong would still act as a
floor on what the government could claim as an important interest, the 
government could effectively identify its interests by statute. Such 
interests should receive deference, which would make the analysis 
more objective. This would avoid one of the most taxing and frequently 
challenged parts of Sell212—determining what constitutes a “serious 
crime.”
After the Government-Interest Prong, the remaining prongs 
involve a fact-heavy analysis that depends on determinations made by
medical professionals.213 As a matter of institutional competence, state 
drive the analysis, even where the challenge was brought solely under the state statute. See
Seekins, 8 A.3d at 500–07 (looking to the Sell cases when determining the importance of the state’s
interest as referenced by the state statute). This is likely because the statute mirrors the language
of Sell and provides no independent guidance. See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 54-56d (2018).
208. United States v. Green, 532 F.3d 538, 547 (6th Cir. 2008) (quoting the district court’s 
order).
 209. Id. at 548.
 210. See, e.g., Seekins, 8 A.3d at 501–03 (reviewing the debates over measuring “seriousness”).
 211. See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE § 10.77.092(1) (2018) (“For purposes of [restoration], a
pending charge involving any one or more of the following crimes is a serious offense per
se . . . .”).
212. Stewart B. Harman, Note, Restoration of Competency Through Involuntary Medication:
Applying the Sell Factors, 4 APPALACHIAN J.L. 127, 133 (2005) (identifying the “failure to provide
a definition of what constitutes a serious crime” as one of the “essential flaws” of Sell). 
213. See, e.g., United States v. Fazio, 599 F.3d 835, 841 (8th Cir. 2010) (rejecting the
defendant’s appeal because the “district court . . . is entitled to resolve such evidentiary conflicts
given the conflicting expert testimony”).
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legislatures are better suited to make judgments about factual-finding 
requirements, levels of specificity and individualization, procedures, 
and so on.214 This would give courts an objective basis for requirements 
not imposed by Sell and would keep the courts—especially appellate 
courts—from getting too involved with second-guessing medical 
decisions and procedures. For example, a Maryland statute regarding 
involuntary treatment in the civil-commitment context lays out the
procedures required to obtain an involuntary-medication order, 
including notice requirements, pre-approval procedures, procedures 
required for the approving tribunal, written-decision requirements,
post-approval procedures, appeals, renewal of treatment, and
documentation.215 
This new approach would provide sorely needed guidance to state 
courts, alleviating their need to look to the divergent federal 
interpretations or add other new requirements to the Sell test. Instead
of repeating the federal circuits’ mistakes, state courts should apply the 
basic Sell standard as a baseline and, based on considerations of judicial 
restraint and institutional competence, let the state legislatures 
elaborate on Sell. 
CONCLUSION
This Note intends to shift the dialogue on Sell. Sell is a federal 
constitutional standard and much of the academic attention paid to it 
has been focused solely on whether it adequately protects the rights of 
criminal defendants in federal courts. Yet the federal courts order 
involuntary medication for only twenty-five defendants or so each
year. The greater impact of Sell is in the state courts, which hear many 
more cases than the federal courts and thus are likely to deal with many 
more Sell requests. The muddled state of the federal Sell regime has 
left the state high courts picking between conflicting federal 
interpretations when implementing Sell in the states. Worse, some of 
the interpretations are unfaithful to Sell, upsetting the balance created 
by the Supreme Court. Unfortunately, state high courts are likely to
repeat the same mistakes and further entrench these divergent and 
flawed interpretations. 
214. See Scott Brewer, Scientific Expert Testimony and Intellectual Due Process, 107 YALE 
L.J. 1535, 1538 (1998) (criticizing legal systems which use decision-making procedures “in which
nonexpert judges . . . are called upon and authorized to evaluate expert scientific testimony”).
 215. MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH–GEN. § 10-708 (West 2018). 





7732019] HOW THE STATES CAN FIX SELL 
But while Sell is not perfect, it is a workable standard that is 
reasonably effective at balancing the relevant interests. More 
importantly, it is federal law and state courts cannot change it. And 
while they could augment the Sell regime via state constitutional law, 
they have yet to do so and appear unlikely to. Instead, state legislatures 
can and should act to give structure to the Sell regime in their states, 
give guidance to the state courts, and, if desired, create additional 
protections for criminal defendants. Providing such a comprehensive 
regime would free state courts from what is essentially a policy 
decision—picking between the various Sell approaches and 
determining how Sell should be applied in the states. 
